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The primary aim of this discussion is to present a detailed case study of Descartes’s use of 
émotion in Les passions de l’ame and in his early writings leading up to that work. A secondary 
aim is to argue that that while Descartes was innovative in suggesting that émotion might be a 
better keyword for the affective sciences than passion, he did not consistently follow his own 
advice. His innovation therefore failed in that regard, even though it did inspire later thinkers to 
explore the distinction between ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in their own manner. 
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1 Introducing Émotion 
There are seventeen occurrences of the term émotion – eight of émotions – in René Descartes’s 
1649 Les passions de l’ame. The first two occurrences figure in an attempt to define the term 
passion. The passages are reproduced immediately below, first in their original French printed 
form, then in a contemporary English translation. They will serve as a reference point for the 
discussion that follows.1  
First, we begin with Article 27:   
 
Article XXVII. La definition des passions de l’ame 
Apres avoir consideré en qyoy les passions de l’ame different de toutes ses autres 
pensées, il me semble qu’on peut généralement les definir des perceptions, ou des 
sentimens, ou des émotions de l’ame, qu’on rapporte particulierement a elle, & 
                                                 
1 Citations from Les passions de l’ame are taken from Descartes, Œuvres, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 
11 vols (Paris: Cerf, 1897–1909), http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ctolley/texts/descartes.html (hereafter 
AT). English translations of passages in Les passions de l’ame will be taken from The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985) (hereafter CSM). All other English translations are by the author unless otherwise noted. 
Note that French accents are not always consistently applied in the original texts (Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 
trans. Steven H. Voss, intro. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 138). Finally, hereafter émotions 
will usually be understood as émotion(s) but rendered simply as émotion, for reasons of simplicity. 
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qui sont causées, entrenuës & fortifiées par quelque mouvement des esprits. (AT, 
XI, 349–50)  
 
(Article 27. Definition of the passions of the soul 
After having considered in what respect the passions of the soul differ from all its 
other thoughts, it seems to me that we may define them generally as those 
perceptions, sensations, or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, 
and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the 
animal spirits. (CSM, 338–39)) 
 
Second, there is Article 28, which is quoted in abbreviated form: 
 
Article XXVIII. Explication de la premiere partie de cette définition  
On les peut nommer des perceptions … ou des volontez; … On les peut aussi 
nommer des sentimens … Mais on peut encore mieux les nommer des émotions 
de l’ame, non seulement à cause que ce nom peut estre attribué à tous les 
changemens qui arrivent en elle, c’est à dire a toutes les diverses pensées qui luy 
vienent; mais particulierement pource que, de toutes les sortes de pensées qu’elle 
peut avoir, il n’y en a point d’autres qui l’agitent & l’esbranlent si fort que font 




(Article 28. Explanation of the first part of this definition 
We may call them ‘perceptions’ … or volitions, … We may also call them 
‘sensations’ … But it is even better to call them ‘emotions’ of the soul, not only 
because they this term may be applied to all the changes which occur in the soul – 
that is, to all the various thoughts which come to it – but more particularly 
because, of all the kinds of thoughts that the soul may have, there are none that 
agitate and disturb it so strongly as the passions. (CSM, 339))  
Les passions de l’ame has an interesting publishing history.2 Briefly, the text was originally 
written in French and then printed by Henri Le Gras in Paris and Louys Elzevier in Amsterdam. 
The original 1649 French edition does not contain a table of contents or an index, which is 
important in understanding word counts of key terms like émotion.3  
There is a Latin edition of Les passions de l’ame, entitled Passiones animae, published in 
1650 by Elzevier in Amsterdam. It is based on the original 1649 French edition but was not 
translated by Descartes himself. Indeed, it is very likely that Descartes never got to correct this 
Latin translation, as was usually his habit.4 This will be important to remember when we 
                                                 
2 AT, XI, 293–300; Rodis-Lewis 1955, 37–39; Voss 1989, xv. 
3 Descartes, Les passions de l’ame, intro. and notes Genevieve Rodis-Lewis (Paris: Vrin, 1955), 39. 
4 Stephen H. Voss, ‘How Spinoza Enumerated the Affects,’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 63, no. 2 (1981): 
167–79 (167–68); Stephen H. Voss, ‘On the Authority of the Passiones Animae,’ Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 75, no. 2 (1993): 160–78 (esp. 171, 178). 
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examine the proposed Latin equivalents of Descartes’s affective vocabulary in Les passions de 
l’ame and compare it with the Latin edition.    
 
2 Research Objectives 
In Articles 27 and 28 Descartes not only introduces the term émotion for the first time in Les 
passions de l’ame. He also proposes a new stipulative definition of the term and appears to 
recommend that we adopt it on the grounds that it is even better (encore mieux) than any of its 
available French counterparts: passions, perceptions, sentimens and affections. Popular Latin 
candidates like affectus, afficio and affectio from the era ‘before emotion’ are not mentioned at 
all in the body of this French version of Les passions de l’ame.5 Descartes does cite the Spanish 
philosopher Juan Luis Vivès (1493–1540), whose preferred term for what Descartes refers to as 
émotion is the Latin term affectus.6 But in general no Latin substitutes or background 
information are provided on the use of émotion and passion in Les passions de l’ame. This 
suggests a confidence in the theoretical clarity, integrity and independence of the French 
language in this domain. 
It is also important to remember that at the very beginning of Les passions de l’ame, 
Descartes tells us that ‘I shall be obliged to write just as if I were considering a topic that no one 
had dealt with before me’ (‘obligé d’escire icy en mesme façon, que si je traitois d’une matiere 
                                                 
5 Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400–1800, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, Michael W. Champion, and Kirk 
Essary (New York: Routledge, 2019). 
6 Descartes, Les passions, intro. and notes Rodis-Lewis, 24n4, 28n3. 
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que j’amais personne avant moy n’eust touchée’) (CSM, 328; AT, XI, 328). He also tells us that 
he is proposing to approach the topic as a natural scientist (physicien), and not as a rhetorician 
(orateur) or moral philosopher (philosophe moral). At first glance, a radically new scientific 
treatment of the topic, in a new scientific language, accompanied by a new term to replace the 
old one – émotion instead of passion – would appear to be consonant with the desire to make a 
fresh start on the topic: to innovate.  
The problem is that immediately after inviting us to adopt émotion in a new, predominantly 
psychological, stipulated sense of the term, Descartes goes on to employ passion instead of 
émotion as his preferred term of art throughout most of the remainder of his book. He also retains 
passion in the title of his book. There is in fact a puzzling difference between the title on the 
second title page of the French edition of Descartes’s book, namely, Les passions de l’ame, and 
the title on the second title page of the Latin edition, namely, Passiones sive affectus animae 
(which in French means Passions, ou émotions, de l’âme). On this question, Steven Voss goes so 
far as to claim that ‘if Descartes had had a chance to review the translation, he would have 
renamed it’.7 The anomaly speaks to the complex possibilities inherent in the Latin affective 
vocabulary of the time.8 As it turns out, commotiones, and not affectus, is arguably the more 
                                                 
7 Voss, ‘On the Authority of the Passiones Animae,’ 177. 
8 Michael J. Champion, Kirk Essary, and Juanita Feros Ruys, ‘Introduction: The Language of Affect from Late 
Antiquity to Early Modernity,’ in Before Emotion, ed. Ruys, Champion, and Essary, 1–8; Yasmin Haskell, Raphaele 
Garrod, Michael W. Champion, and Juanita Feros Ruy, ‘But Were They Talking about Emotion?: Affectus, 
Affection, and the History of Emotion,’ Rivista Storica Italiana 128, no. 2 (2016): 521–43; Before Emotion, ed. 
Ruys, Champion, and Essary.  
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popular term for translating the French émotion in the Latin edition (art. XXVII, 14; art. XXVIII, 
15; art. XXIX, 15).9 This is an apt warning of things to come, as similar problems arise in the 
case of English translation.  
Thus, despite his gestures towards émotion as a promising new keyword for the affective 
sciences, Descartes does not abandon passion. At the same time, this does not annul the fact that 
he does introduce émotion. This perplexing situation has not been sufficiently acknowledged or 
studied in the history of these developments. Perhaps this is why there are such wide 
discrepancies in the scholarship on the status of the term émotion in Descartes’s Les passions de 
l’ame? Some praise him for introducing émotion into the philosophical and scientific lexicon of 
                                                 
9 Descartes, Passiones animae, per Renatum Descartes, gallice ab ipso conscriptae, nunc autem ... latina civitate 
donatae ab H. D. M. j. u. l. (Amsterdam: L. Elzevir, 1650), http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb303285118. 
Consider, for example: ‘commotio quae fit est cordi’ (art. XLVI, 23), ‘commotiones animae,’ ‘commotionis 
sentiamus,’ ‘commotio sanguinis’ (art. LXXXIX, 42), ‘commotio animae,’ ‘commotio producta à spiritibus,’ 
‘Commotionibus’ (art. XXXIX, 37), ‘commotio animae,’ ‘commotione,’ ‘commotionem’ (art .XCI, 42–43), 
‘commotione’ (art. CXXVI, 58), ‘commotiones animae’ (art. CXLVII, 69), ‘internae commotiones’ (art. CXLVIII, 
70), ‘commotio’ (art. CLX, 75), ‘commotione in illo sanguine,’ ‘commotio’ (art. CCI, 93), ‘commotionis’ (art. 
CCIII, 93), ‘sentitur ea sanguinis commotio,’ ‘commotionem est in sanguine’ (art. CCXI, 97). On its part, affectus 
and its variants tend to figure more among the Latin substitutes for passion: for example: ‘excite la passion de la 
joye’ (‘excitat laetitae affectum’) (art. XCI, 43); ‘toute les passions’ (‘in genere omnis affectus’) (art. CXLVII, 70); 
‘toutes les autres passions’ (‘omnibus passionibus’); ‘contre tous les exces des passions’ (‘contra omnis excessus 
Affectuum est’) (art. CCXI, 97).    
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his day and view it as a major innovation.10 Others do not mention the matter at all, or at least 
appear to treat it as an issue of little significance for the understanding of Descartes’s text and his 
wider legacy.11 There is much at stake in this intriguing situation. Is it really with the lectures of 
Scottish philosopher Thomas Brown ‘that the term “emotion” definitively took on its new status 
as a theoretical category in mental science’, as Thomas Dixon has eloquently argued?12 Or is 
René Descartes the real father of the modern concept of ‘emotion’, as the present study suggests? 
At the very least, one thing this study should show is that any decision to use the terms ‘passion’ 
and ‘emotion’ interchangeably in the study of Descartes’s writings, or simply to exchange one 
term for the other in order to keep things clear and consistent, are practices that are fraught with 
peril and require elaborate scrutiny and defence. There are numerous aspects of Cartesian 
scholarship that arguably probably need to be revisited in this light. 
Our main task in what follows will be to document the exegetical details behind this curious 
state of affairs. This will require a return to the original French and Latin texts themselves, since 
some of the pertinent issues can only be formulated in those terms and are understandably 
                                                 
10 Thomas Dixon, From Passion to Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Amelie Rorty, ‘From 
Passions to Emotions and Sentiments,’ Philosophy 57, no. 220 (1982): 159-172; Susan James, Passion and Action: 
The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
11 Lilli Alanen, Descartes’ Concept of Mind (Cambridge and Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003); Deborah, J. 
Brown, Descartes and the Passionate Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Descartes, Les 
passions de l’ame, intro. and notes Genevieve Rodis-Lewis (Paris: Vrin, 1955). 
12 Thomas Dixon, ‘“Emotion”: The History of a Keyword in Crisis,’ Emotion Review 4, no. 4 (2012): 338–44 (340); 
Dixon, From Passion to Emotion, 133. 
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supplanted in contemporary English translations of those texts, where intelligibility and not 
literality is usually the main concern.    
But why introduce émotion in the first place? A hypothesis for which there are interesting 
versions and precedents is that émotion is associated with metaphors of movement that offer 
novel opportunities to reformulate and study the more dynamic and relational qualities of the 
passions, which are stifled by the more passive associations of passion. For example, philosopher 
Amelie Rorty described the situation this way:  
 
Instead of being reactions to invasions from something external to the self, passions 
became the very activities of the mind, its own motions. So transformed they become 
proper motives, and along with desires, the beginnings of actions.13  
 
Exploring this hypothesis in light of the data unearthed by our exegetical study will constitute 
the second major task of this discussion. The hope is not only to supplement and deepen the 
scope of the evidence for that hypothesis, but also to begin to lay the groundwork for assessing 
the success of Descartes’s proposed innovation to introduce émotion into the scientific lexicon of 
                                                 
13 Rorty, ‘From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments,’ 159. On this general line of thought see also Dixon, From 
Passion to Emotion, 76–77, 109; Anik Waldow, ‘Reconceptualizing Affect: Descartes on the Passions,’ in Before 
Emotion, ed. Ruys, Champion, and Essary, 199–211 (208).  
9 
 
his day. The argument in this last case will be that Descartes largely failed to live up to his own 
innovative aims with regard to the new psychological definition of émotion he recommends.  
Overall, the conclusion of this study is that while Descartes does indeed deserve credit for 
introducing émotion into the scientific lexicon of his day, he ultimately failed to deliver a 
consistent theoretical account in which émotion plays a successful explanatory role. At the same 
time, he changed the history of affective terms and concepts forever.  
 
3 Émotion before Descartes 
The question of precedents for Descartes’s use of the term émotion in Les passions de l’ame is 
seldom explored in detail by scholars interested in that text. Yet it is impossible to fully 
appreciate the nature of his contribution in that area, and the difficulties he faced, without 
considering those precedents. Etymology is a required starting point. 
The Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1300–1500) contains an interesting selection of 
examples of early usages of the term émotion:  
A. – ‘Instigation’ … À l'esmotion de. ‘À l'instigation de’: ...le duc de Lancastre 
conduiseur de la gent Angloise à l'esmotion du duc de Bretaigne … (CABARET 
D’ORV., Chron. Loys de Bourb. C., 1429, 53).  
B. – [À propos d’une communauté] ‘Émeute, soulèvement, mouvement populaire’ … 
(CABARET D’ORV., Chron. Loys de Bourb. C., 1429, 5) … 
10 
 
C. – [À propos de pers.] ‘Mouvement (sous l’action d’une chose qui frappe), 
excitation’: Cestui predist le grant mouvement de terre, qui fut en Constantinoble … 
et aussi la famine, qui fut lors en plusieurs lieux et la fervente esmocion des enfans 
pour aller à Saint Michel. (SIMON DE PHARES, Astrol., c.1494–1498, f° 156 v°). 
D. – ‘Bouleversement, trouble moral’.14 
Selective translation of key words in these passages indicates that, in this context, the term 
émotion (ésmocion, ésmotion) is sometimes tied to psychological disturbances or movements 
(‘trouble moral’), and at other times, physical disturbances or movements of crowds (‘d’une 
population’). The dominant metaphor is one of movement, excitation and agitation. 
On its side, Le Littré (XMLittré v2) Dictionnaire de la langue française delineates three basic 
senses of the term émotion: 
 
1. Mouvement qui se passe dans une population.  
2. Agitation populaire qui précède une sédition, et quelquefois la sédition elle-même; 
ce qui est un mouvement moitié physique, moitié moral.   
                                                 
14 Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1300–1500), http://www.atilf.fr/dmf. 
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3. Mouvement moral qui trouble et agite, et qui se produit sous l’empire d’une idée, 
d’un spectacle, d’une contradiction, et quelquefois spontanément sous l’influence 
d’une perturbation nerveuse, comme cela a lieu quelquefois dans l’hypocondrie.15  
 
(1. Movement that occurs within a population.  
2. Agitation on the part of a crowd which precedes, or at times constitutes, sedition; 
which is both half physical movement and half moral movement. 
3. Moral movement that both troubles and agitates, and that is produced under the 
domination of an idea, a performance, a contradiction, and at times the spontaneous 
influence of a nervous perturbation, as can happen in hypochondriasis.) 
Again, movement is a dominant metaphor, as suggested by the proposed Latin etymology of the 
term: ‘emotionem, de emotum, supin de emovere’.16 Notably – and philosophically crucial – like 
the Dictionnaire du Moyen Français, the Littré also points out that there exist both psychological 
and physical senses of the term. So does the Oxford English Dictionary. Motion then is the 
dominant metaphor in both the psychological and physical senses of émotion, as reflected by the 
Latin emovere, which suggest a moving out: ‘ēmovēre to remove, expel, to banish from the 
mind, to shift, displace (< ē- e- prefix2 + movēre move v.) + -iō -ion suffix1)’.17 The same is true 
                                                 
15 Le Littré (XMLittré v2) Dictionnaire de la langue française, by É. Littré, https://www.littre.org. 
16 XMLittré v2. 
17 Oxford English Dictionary, https://oed.com. 
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of mid-sixteenth-century English, a fact that is evident in the first English translation of Les 
passions de l’ame, published in 1650, where both psychological and physical uses of the term 
‘emotion’ are employed.  
Aside from etymological dictionaries, another valuable source of insights on French usages of 
the term émotion before Descartes is the Essais of Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), which 
Descartes almost certainly read.18 Along with the playwright Pierre Corneille (1606–1684), 
Montaigne is widely regarded as one of the most influential cultural figures of the ‘French 
Renaissance’. Each employs the term émotion in a variety of ways. For reasons of brevity we 
focus only on Montaigne. 
In his 1580 Essais, Montaigne refers several times to both émotion and émotions in what 
seems to be a psychological sense. For example, at one point he refers to an extraordinary 
emotion of pleasure (‘une emotion de plaisir extraordinaire’).19 In another case, there is a 
reference to feeling an emotion in relation to a son bidding farewell to his mother (‘[il] sentit 
toutefois l’émotion de cette adieu maternel’).20 However, there are also instances where émotion 
and émotions appear to have more physical connotations, for example when the pulse is 
                                                 
18 Michael Moriarty, ‘Descartes and Montaigne’. In The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne, Philippe Desans, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 1-20). 
19 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de, Les essais, ed. P. Villey and V.-L. Saulnier (Paris: PUF, 1965), 424, online ed. P. 
Desan, University of Chicago, https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/montessaisvilley/. 
20 Montaigne, Essais, 235. 
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concerned (‘pendant que le pouls nous bats et que nous sentons de l’émotion’).21 A purely 
physical example of the term occurs in the context of a remark on emotions of air and wind (‘une 
émotion d’air et de vent’).22 Therefore, as early as Montaigne’s Essais – which although 
originally published in 1580, were subsequently reedited and organised in 1588 and 1595 – there 
is clear evidence of both physical and psychological uses of émotion at the highest levels of 
French literary culture. 
To sum up, it is clear that the term émotion was well established and widely employed in the 
French language before Descartes began writing Les passions de l’ame. It is also equally clear 
that it was used in both a psychological and a physical sense, with strong connotations of 
movement and action in each case. All of this makes Descartes’s recommendation that it would 
be better (‘encore mieux’) to use émotion rather than passion in the scientific study of states like 
joy and anger seem all the more innovative. Stipulating one primary usage of the term was not in 
accord with current practice in the literary arts, which allowed multiple senses and uses of the 
term. And it certainly went against established physical medical usages of the term, such as 
émotion du pouls (emotions of the pulse). 
 
                                                 
21 Montaigne, Essais, 715. 
22 Montaigne, Essais, 914. 
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4 Émotion in Descartes’s Early Works and Correspondence  
We turn now to examine how émotion is employed in Descartes’s early works, written before 
Les passions de l’ame, and his correspondence. Little attention appears to have been paid to that 
history, even though it is of central importance in understanding the trajectory of émotion in 
relation to passion up to and including Les passions de l’ame. This review also shows that 
Descartes’s decision to highlight émotion in Les passions de l’ame was not only innovative with 
respect to how the term was used in the literary contexts considered above, but even with respect 
to his own earlier uses of those terms.       
 
4.1 Early Works 
Descartes’s interest in the passions is evident in his very first publication, the Compendium 
musicae, which was originally written in Latin in 1618, but only intended for private 
circulation.23 This first, very short, work by Descartes was only officially published 
posthumously in Latin in 1650 and then in French in 1668. The passions figure centrally in the 
Compendium. Indeed, the very first line of text states that the end (finis) of music is to move 
(moveat) and activate (excitant) the passions (affectus): More precisely, the goal of music is to 
instil and excite the passions (‘Le but de l’art est d’emouvoir en nous les passions’).24 Note that 
Descartes’s affective vocabulary here is taken entirely from Latin. Later French translations of 
                                                 
23 Rodis-Lewis, 1995, 48, 51. 
24 Rodis-Lewis 1995, 51. 
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the work would not have been verified by Descartes, but the Latin terms he uses in the 
Compendium do provide some clues regarding his preferred choices in the Latin affective 
vocabulary at this time. His preferred Latin term for ‘passion’ appears to be affectus.25 This is a 
reasonable and popular choice. However, in general this is a turbulent period, where affective 
terminology is very much in flux and varies in very nuanced and sophisticated ways.26   
Passions are also an important topic in L’homme, which was originally written in French 
around 1633.27 L’homme was intended to be a chapter in a larger work, provisionally entitled Le 
monde, which was never fully completed. Frightened by Galileo’s recent persecution by the 
Church, Descartes initially decided not to publish Le monde, though some copies of L’homme 
and other texts were circulated to friends .28 L’homme was only officially published 
posthumously, first in a 1622 Latin edition, then in a 1664 compilation of the French original 
along with other related writings of Descartes, as well as supporting materials by other authors, 
including a lengthy commentary by physician Louis la Forge.  
                                                 
25 Voss, ‘On the Authority of the Passiones Animae,’ 176–77. 
26 Champion, Essary, and Ruys, ‘Introduction’; Kirk Essary, ‘Passions, Affections, or Emotions? On the Ambiguity 
of 16th-Century Terminology,’ Emotion Review 9, no. 4 (2017): 367–74; Haskell et al., ‘But Were They Talking 
about Emotion?,’ esp. 1n3; Russ Leo, ‘Affective Physics: Affectus in Spinoza’s Ethica,’ in Passions and Subjectivity 
in Early Modern Culture, ed. Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis (Ashgate e-Book, 2013; New York: Routledge, 
2016), 33–49 (38). 
27 Genevieve Rodis-Lewis, Descartes: His Life and Thought. (Ithaca: N.Y.: Cornell,  1999, 153). 
28 Rodis Lewis, 1999, 154. 
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The purpose of L’homme is to provide a purely physiological and mechanical scientific 
framework for explaining the functions of the body, the senses, the various organs, and the pineal 
gland, without any allusion to the soul (esprit) and its interactions with the body. Like Le monde, 
L’homme is quite literally an exercise in scientific imagination – Descartes considered it a fable 
(fable) (AT, VI, 4–5) – built on the best science of the day, but substituting imaginary 
explanations where science itself falls short.29 In part, L’homme is meant to provide an account 
of how passions and emotions are physically possible in creatures without a soul. The work is 
important for us because it contains several early occurrences of the French term passions, as 
well as a single occurrence of émotion that has no discernible analogue in any of Descartes’s 
other works, including Les passions de l’ame. 
In L’homme, Descartes engages the issue of the passions (passions) in a discussion of 
humours (humeurs), which he refers to as movements (mouuemens) and natural inclinations 
(inclinations naturelles) that may dispose (disposent) us to certain passions (AT, XI, 166). It is 
interesting that while he mentions one traditional humoral type in this discussion, the choleric 
temperament (l’humeur colérique), he fails to mention any other traditional humoral types by 
name, for example, the sanguine, the phlegmatic or the melancholic types. Instead, he focuses his 
attention on other sorts of states, some of them ostensible character traits or temperaments, some 
of them not, that are all termed humeurs nonetheless, for example, tranquillity of mind 
(tranquilité de l’esprit), joy (l’humeur joyeuse) and sadness (l’humeur triste), as well as an 
                                                 
29 See also Rodis-Lewis, 1999, 146–47. 
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unnamed humour – cette humeur – that makes us pleasant (complaisans) and well-meaning 
(bienfaisans) (AT, XI, 167).  
Recall that all of these humours can dispose us to passions, which raises the question whether 
they might cause and correspond to passions of the same name and categorical type as the 
humours themselves. The question cannot be pursued or resolved at this stage, but invites 
comparison with Descartes’s later enumeration of the passions in Les passions de l’ame. It is also 
worth noting that some of the humoral states or traits identified in L’homme appear very much 
like what we would now consider ‘moods’ (fleeting or enduring) rather than naturally fixed 
states of character or temperament. This suggests that Descartes may be going beyond the 
bounds of traditional humoral theory in this discussion, perhaps even anticipating elements of the 
modern concept of mood.  
Certainly, Descartes’s use of émotions in this discussion appears to be both unusual and 
innovative, in that it is quite unique. He refers to émotions interièures that are caused by external 
stimuli (in this case a flame) and that follow the same nerve channels as pain (douleur) and are 
therefore internal states like pain (semblable) in that respect (AT, XI, 193). We shall soon have 
occasion to see that this early use of émotions by Descartes appears to differ markedly from his 
later use of that term in Les passions de l’ame, where by definition ‘internal’ emotions are also 
deemed to be ‘intellectual’, and as such are not directly caused or sustained by animal spirits 
travelling through the nerves. But this is to anticipate. The finding underlines the importance of 
enquiring into passions and émotions in Descartes’s early works before we consider their status 
and relationship in Les passions de l’ame. 
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It is worth noting that in his lengthy commentary on L’homme, physician Louis La Forge does 
not question Descartes’s use of the terms passion and émotions. He adopts the same terminology, 
but treats the two terms as if they are meant to be theoretically distinct and not interchangeable. 
For example, he refers to ‘emotions of the passions’ (‘émotions des passions’) (AT, XI, 252). He 
also remarks that we feel the emotions of our passions in a manner that is different from how we 
feel other impressions from our senses (‘il en va de mesme des passions, dont nous ressentons les 
émotions tout d’une autre façon, que les autres impressions de nos sens’) (AT, XI, 252; my 
translation). Finally, La Forge highlights the distinction between an emotion of the stomach 
(émotion de l’estomac) and the desire to eat (le desir de manger) (AT, XI, 252). None of these 
distinctions or variations are immediately evident in Descartes’s text. Which means that we 
should be wary of uncritically identifying passions with émotions in this or any other work of 
his, and that we should refrain from simply assuming that the two terms are synonymous and 
interchangeable.30  
Additional evidence of Descartes’s early interest in the passions can be found in his 1644 
Principia philosophiae, later published in a 1647 French translation entitled Les principes de la 
philosophie. As the title page of this French edition explicitly states, the translation was verified 
                                                 
30 Susan James, Passion and Action, 7n28, 95–96, considers Descartes to be among those seventeenth-century 
writers ‘who use the terms “passion” and “emotion” synonymously.’ This would appear to run directly counter to 
Thomas Dixon’s stern admonition that, in exegetical contexts like the present one, ‘we should not assume that 
“emotions” and “passions” are the same things’ (From Passion to Emotion, 13, 20). The exegetical evidence 
reviewed in this case study clearly shows that synonymy cannot be assumed in this context.  
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by Descartes. The translator, moreover, was well-known to Descartes, and was none other than 
his close friend and colleague l’abbé Picot.31 We can therefore in all likelihood be assured that 
any proposed French translations for key Latin terms and concepts in the French edition of the 
Principia reflect Descartes’s considered judgement on the lexical and conceptual matters 
involved.32 This is important, since the French edition of the Principia contains several 
references to émotions that prefigure his later use of the term in Les passions de l’ame. 
In the 1647 Les Principes de la philosophie, Descartes refers to things (choses) that we 
experience in ourselves that should not (doivent point) be attributed to the soul alone (l’ame 
seule) nor to the body alone (corps seul) but to the intimate union (étroite union) that exists 
between them. Such experiences include our appetites (appetits) to drink and eat, and the 
emotions or passions of the soul (les émotions ou les passions de l’ame). (AT, IX, 45). They also 
include sensations (sentimens) and all other qualities (qualités) that fall under the umbrella of our 
sense of touch (sens de l’attouchement) (AT, IX, 45).  
The manner in which émotions or passions are specified in this last passage must be cited in 
full. The relevant text is this: ‘les emotions ou les passions de l’ame, qui ne dependent pas de la 
pensée seule, comme l’émotion à la colere, à la joyë, à la tristesse, à l’amour, &c.’ (‘the emotions 
or passions of the mind which do not consist of thought alone, such as the emotions of anger, 
joy, sadness, and love’) (AT, IX, 33; CSM, 209). This last passage is interesting because of the 
manner in which it appears to single out a case where thoughts (pensées) that can be referred to 
                                                 
31 Rodis-Lewis, 1999, 210–11. 
32 Rodis-Lewis 1999, 219–20. 
20 
 
as emotions or passions (émotions ou passions) can, in some cases, also be referred to as 
emotions (émotions) only.  
There are added complications. In a later passage in the Principes that mentions the same 
examples referred to in the first passage above, Descartes mentions the same states, though in a 
different order. In English translation, the passage reads: ‘all the disturbances or passions and 
emotions of the mind like joy sorrow, love, and hate and so on’ (‘la joye, la tristesse, l’amour, la 
colère & toutes les autres passions’) (CSM, 280; AT, IX, 311). Curiously, the English translation 
of this last passage refers to ‘passions and emotions of the mind’ (CSM, 280; my emphasis) and 
does not appear to respect the restriction to passions in the original French text. In fact, it does 
not even qualify the states in question as ‘passions’ (passions) at all, as is the case in the French 
original, the last qualification of which – ‘& toutes les autres passions’ – is very different from 
the noncommittal expression ‘and so on’ (CSM, 280). 
In other words, there would appear to be cases where ‘passions’ can be considered emotions 
(émotions) only, and cases where they are not considered emotions only, but rather fully 
embodied passions (passions) of the union of the soul and the body. In the former case, we can 
speak of ‘emotions’ of anger, joy, sadness and love as states that are independent of the union of 
the soul and the body, while in the latter case, we can speak of joy, sadness, love and anger as 
‘passions’ that are dependent on the union of the soul and the body. This, in turn, could be taken 
to suggest that the two terms may not be equivalent and interchangeable in all contexts. 
To further complicate things, consider that Descartes also refers to states of the former type as 
purely intellectual and independent of any ‘emotions of the body’ (‘indépendante des émotions 
du corps’) which is rendered as ‘bodily disturbances’ in our chosen English translation of this 
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passage (CSM, 281; AT, IX, 311). Descartes gives the example of a joy that is ‘purely 
intellectual’ (‘une joye purement intellectuelle’), though the word purement is inexplicably 
omitted in the English translation (AT, IX, 311; CSM, 281).  
If we take the French version of these last passages as our guide, these findings suggest that in 
Descartes’s view at this time, there can be emotions of the body (émotions du corps) just as there 
are emotions of the soul (émotions de l’ame). This puzzling and ostensibly inconsistent usage 
recurs in Les passions de l’ame, although it is rarely mentioned by English speaking 
commentators. These matters will not be pursued further here. But they do show that Descartes’s 
use of affective terms34 in his early works is relevant to the question of the status of émotion in 
                                                 
34 In order to ground the present discussion, it is helpful to stipulate that the specific examples of passion and 
émotion that Descartes cites in these early texts shall serve as prototypes of the ‘affective’ (our expression) states 
and terms that he wishes to discuss. Anger (colère), joy (joye) and sadness (tristesse) are then the ‘kind’ of states he 
is primarily concerned with and they can be called ‘affective’ for ease of reference. The full list of such states and 
terms is provided in Les passions de l’ame, which is where, through enumeration, Descartes fixes the extension of 
the set of states he is concerned to discuss. Starting with six primitive passions, Descartes goes on to carefully 
distinguish forty passions, all of which are given a distinct French name (see, for example, Voss 1981, Table 1, 171–
73). This is the list of states and their French names in the order in which they appear: Admiration, Estime, Mespris, 
Generosité, Orgueil, Humilité, Bassesse, Veneration, Dedain, Amour, Haine, Desir, Esperance, Crainte, Jalousie, 
Securité, Desespoir, Irresolution, Courage, Hardiesse, Emulation, Lacheté, Epouvante, Peur, Remors, Joye, 
Tristesse, Moquerie, Envie, Pitié, Satisfaction, Repentir, Faveur, Reconnoissance, Indignation, Colere, Gloire, 
Honte, Desgout, Regret, Allegresse (Voss, 1981, 171–73). Note that while the following additional states are 
mentioned in Les passions de l’ame, they are not officially designated as passions in the enumeration: Ambition, Ris, 
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Les passions de l’ame, even though – as we shall see – those precedents are sometimes reflected, 
and sometimes not, in that text. 
 
4.2 Correspondence  
There remains the matter of Descartes’s correspondence, which ranges from 1622 to the 
publication of Les passions de l’ame in 1649 and his death shortly thereafter, in 1650 (AT, I–
IV).35 The correspondence provides evidence from both Descartes and his interlocutors that there 
was nothing especially unusual about using the French term passions, or indeed émotion, in the 
vernacular French of this period, which seems to be well-established. In the correspondence, 
passion sometimes occurs in contexts where a more precise understanding of its application is 
sought, for example, the origins of the passion of fear (la passion de la crainte) (AT, IV, 312). At 
other times, they simply occur as generally accepted figures of speech, for example, a passion for 
liberty (passion pour la liberté) (AT, I, 201). 
The situation with émotions is more complex and especially important for our purposes. There 
are several occasions where the term is used rather innocently in connection with the experience 
of reading a letter, for example: ‘I have read with much emotion’ (‘I’ay leu auec beaucoup 
                                                 
Aversion, Bienvueillance, Avarice, Yvresse, Brutalité, Devotion, Vengeance, Courtoisie, Modesite, Raillerie, 
Ingratitude, Cruauté (Voss, 1981, Table II, 173). 
35 For English translations, I refer to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3: The Correspondence, ed. and 
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) (hereafter CSMK). 
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d’émotion’) (CSMK, 257; AT, IV, 278). There are also references to how letters can instil 
emotions in those who receive them: ‘I imagine that most of the letters you receive from other 
people arouse emotions in you’ (‘que plus part des lettres que vous reçevez d’ailleurs vous 
donnent de l’émotion’) (CSMK, 257; AT, IV, 251). But it is the other, more ostensibly medical 
and philosophical, references to émotions in the correspondence that are particularly germane to 
our inquiry.  
In two cases, the term is ostensibly used to refer to physical and not mental states: ‘l’émotion 
de cette vapeur’ (AT, I, 118) and ‘l’émotion qui arrive dans le sang’ (AT, IV, 237). In the latter 
case, this reference to a physical form of émotion which is explicit in the French original is 
incorrectly rendered in the chosen English translation, which reads: ‘the turbulence that affects 
the blood’ and omits the term émotions entirely (CSMK, 253). And in the former case, the 
reference to physical emotion is, along with other passages, omitted from the translation of the 
25 February 1630 letter to Mersenne in which it figures, for unknown editorial reasons (CSMK, 
18–19).  
These more physical and bodily uses of the term émotion differ markedly from the more 
psychological uses we have seen so far. While they reflect well-known and culturally entrenched 
usages of émotions in the French vernacular of the period, they are typically overlooked in the 
scholarship on Les passions de l’ame. Yet as we shall see, they actually occur in that text as well, 
when they are not supplanted in translation. For example, there is a reference to ‘l’émotion qui 
est dans le sang’ (AT, XI, art. CCXI, 487). Again, however, we find that the term émotion is 
omitted in the English translation of the relevant passage, and is replaced by the expression ‘the 
disturbance in our blood’ (CSM, 403). The point here is not to criticise these translations, but 
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rather to probe into some deeper exegetical issues that can only be stated and appreciated by 
reverting to the original texts themselves.    
One last clue regarding the use of émotions in the correspondence occurs in a case where the 
soul is said to receive an emotion ‘that constitutes the passion’ (‘reçoiue l’émotion, en laquelle 
seule consiste la passion’) (CSMK, 271; AT, IV, 312–13). The French text here would appear to 
suggest that there are cases where a passion just is an emotion. So, are passions and emotions 
identical in some circumstances? Is this a case of synonymy? That thesis is not easy to reconcile 
with the other usages of those terms we have considered. Such usages recur in Les passions de 
l’ame, which underscores the importance of this preliminary evidence for examining the status of 
émotion in that work.  
 
5 Émotion in Les passions de l’ame 
The preceding review of the history of émotion before the time of Descartes, as well as the 
review of passion and émotion in his works written before Les passions de l’ame, indicate that 
during this period émotion is quite a protean term. It is generically associated with connotations 
of movement, deriving from its Latin (emovere) and French (émouvoir) etymology. And 
typically, there are also indications of action and excitation – sometimes sudden or unusual – of 
diverse sorts. Importantly, while the various usages of émotion during this period can be loosely 
characterised as psychological or physical, or mixed, it is not in itself exclusively a 
psychological, or a physical, term.  
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Therefore, when, in Articles 27 and 28, Descartes undertakes to define (definir) the passions 
of the soul and suggests that it would be better (mieux) if we named them (nommer) emotions of 
the soul (émotions de l’ame), he appears to be proposing something very innovative. He is 
suggesting that, by stipulation, we adopt a purely psychological and ostensibly ‘affective’ use of 
émotion.36 The reason is that these special states belong to the soul, and so are psychological, and 
at the same time are different than perceptions of outward objects, and from interior sensations 
like hunger and thirst. These émotions de l’ame form a distinct group of ‘affective’ states, 
distinct from either perceptions and sensations. A plausible hypothesis is that, in order to put the 
scientific study of the passions on a firm terminological footing, Descartes believes that we 
should consider adopting a new, stipulated, narrower sense of passion, which in the end leads 
him to émotion. However, there are several steps leading up to this point, and nuances are 
important. Special care must be taken not to read our present-day assumptions and distinctions 
into these earlier texts. This is especially true with the common modern-day supposition that 
‘emotions’ are above all mental, psychological, in nature.  
                                                 
36 Notoriously, Descartes also tells us that these psychological states of the soul are joined to the body as a whole 
(‘jointe à tout le corps’) in a special union (‘unie’), and that it is this union of the soul and body that meet the 
tribunal of experience as a whole (AT, XI, art. XXX, 351; CSM, art. 30, 339). The preservation of that union is the 
primary function of the passions (AT, XI, art. XL, 359; art. LII, 372; CSM, 343, 349–50). In this aspect of 
Descartes’s work, human beings appear to be a distinct, naturally given, ‘kind’ of embodied emoting organism, with 
a fundamentally relational nature that extends from basic sensation and physiology to social forms of life. In this 
sense, human organisms – ‘emoters’ – are fundamentally intersubjective and relational in nature, which seems 
inconsistent with the view of the lone cogito in earlier aspects of Descartes’s work, whose primary mode of being 
seems to be fundamentally insular, private, and subjective.      
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Before we begin our analysis it is important to reiterate what is often taken as an obvious 
exegetical fact about the different kinds of states of the soul considered in Les passions de l’ame. 
This is that passions are not the only major category of such states. In addition, there are also the 
actions (actions) of the soul, namely, its volitions (volontez), which ostensibly are very different 
(AT, XI, art. XVII, 342; art. XXIX, 350; CSM, 335, 339). These willings (volontez) can be called 
emotions of the soul (émotions de l’ame), but they differ from the soul’s passions in that they are 
caused by the soul itself (sont causées par elle mesme). Despite appearances, however, this 
distinction between the soul’s actions and passions is apparently not meant to be hard and fast, 
because the ‘perception of such a willing may be said to be a passion of our soul’ (‘c’est aussi en 
elle une passion d’apercevoir se quelle veut’) (CSM, 336; AT, XI, XIX, 343). Nonetheless, in the 
end we call them actions rather than passions, Descartes tells us, because ‘names are always 
determined by what is most noble’ (‘la denomination se fait tousjours par ce qui est plus noble’) 
and that it is also customary (coustume) to call them actions and not passions (CSM, 336; AT, 
XI, art. XIX, 343). With this puzzling caveat in mind and already two different senses of émotion 
allegedly in front of us, we can begin our analysis of how émotion is employed in Les passions 
de l’ame in earnest.  
Prior to the formal definition of passion presented in Articles 27–29, in Article 25 Descartes 
tells us that when we consider the term passion in its most general sense (‘sa plus générale 
signification’), it is nonetheless customary (coustume) to restrict (restreindre) its use to signify 
(signifier) only those states which refer (se rapportent) to the soul itself (AT, XI, 348; CSM, 
337–38). These, and only these, kinds of states are what he proposes to call passions in his 
chosen, restricted, sense of the term. Feelings (sentimens) of joy (joye) and anger (colère) are the 
only examples provided at this stage, although the list is meant to extend to other similar states 
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(‘autres semblables’). Importantly, such states of the soul are said to be ‘excited’ in us (‘excitez 
en nous’), which is a distinguishing feature of émotions in some usages of the term. An important 
feature of those states is that it is impossible (impossible) that the soul feel them (les sente) 
without them truly being in the soul (AT, XI, art. XXVI, 348; CSM, 337).    
The second step of the argument occurs in Article 28. There, we are invited to use émotion, 
instead of perception, in order to define (definir) the special thoughts (pensées) or states of the 
soul that are customarily referred to as its passions (in the narrow sense). In this article Descartes 
shifts from talking of passions to perceptions where, in this context, perception is understood to 
exclude actions of the soul (‘ne sont point des actions de l’ame’), and willings of the soul (‘ou 
des volontez’) (AT, XI, art. XXVIII, 349; CSM, 339). These perceptions,37 Descartes tells us, 
may also be called feelings (sentimens) on account of the fact that they are received by the soul 
in the same manner as our perceptions of objects (objets) of our external senses (sens 
exterieures), ‘and they are not known by the soul any differently’ (CSM, 339). The emotions of 
the soul (émotions de l’ame), then, are all those states that refer particularly to the soul itself and 
are also caused, fortified and maintained by movements (mouvements) of the animal spirits 
(esprits), which are physical in nature. Note that in this case émotion is invoked in a context 
                                                 
37 Voss uses the term ‘sensation’ instead of ‘perception’ (perception) in his translation of this passage (Descartes, 
Passions, trans. Voss, art. 28, 34). On their part, Cottingham et al. use ‘“sensations”’ (in scare quotes) to translate 
the French sentimens just below (CSM, art. 28, 339). These are not errors but rather very thoughtful efforts to render 
Descartes’s text intelligible to English readers. The problem arises because Descartes himself does not appear to 
clearly or consistently distinguish sensations and sentimens, which are both varieties of feeling (from the French 
sentir, and the Latin sensus). Sentimens and sensations are not yet fully distinct. 
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where movement is crucial, which is consonant with its etymology in both its psychological and 
physical senses, although movement in this case is also tied to the physical substrate of émotion, 
which in turn is understood (more narrowly) to be a psychological state of the soul. So, it is not 
only passion that is supposed to be employed in a restricted sense from now on, it is also 
émotion.  
To sum up, Descartes’s point appears to be that it is not only the term passion that is overly 
inclusive and needs to be restricted in this context. It seems that it is also his view that émotion, 
as well, must be restricted to its psychological aspects. This is evident from the comparison with 
other psychological states, like outward perceptions (perceptions) and inner sensations 
(sensations), which although they are referred to the soul, are nonetheless distinct from feelings 
(sentimens) which are primarily ‘affective’ in nature (see note 34). Quite clearly, what Descartes 
is recommending, at least at this point in the discussion, in these articles, is that we adopt the use 
of the term émotion in its psychological sense,38 to speak of passions in the narrow sense, even 
though his previous remarks on the topic also show that he is aware that it also has a physical 
sense and usage. In effect, the term émotion undergoes a double restriction, or narrowing. It is 
first narrowed to mean émotion in a psychological sense, and then further to refer to states of the 
soul like joy and anger and the like; that is, passions in the narrow sense.  
Why adopt this new restricted sense of émotion? The argument that is provided is twofold. 
Descartes argues that we should consider adopting émotion, because: (a) ‘this term may be 
applied to all the changes which occur in the soul – that is, to all the various thoughts which 
                                                 
38 Leo, ‘Affective Physics,’ 37. 
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come to it’; and (b), ‘more particularly because, of all the kinds of thought which the soul may 
have, there are none that agitate and disturb it so strongly as the passions’ (CSM, 339; my 
emphasis).  
The first argument seems clear enough, but how to make sense of it is a more difficult 
question. The argument appears to be that there is no problem in classifying states of the soul 
(pensées) such as joy and anger and the like as émotions (which is a restricted sense of émotion, 
in the psychological sense), since all the states of the soul are, generically speaking, classifiable 
as émotions anyway. This seems to accord with the interpretation offered by Voss, for example, 
who states that, in Articles 27–29, Descartes is ‘using émotion to speak of the genus and passion 
the species’ of the psychological states he is concerned.39 Note that in that same context, Voss 
also states that in those articles, Descartes ‘maintains a clear distinction between émotion and 
passion’,40 which directly contradicts the view that they are synonymous, a view that is endorsed, 
or at least presupposed or implied, by other commentators.41  
Voss’s argument that émotion functions as a generic term is based on the claim that 
‘Descartes uses émotion extremely broadly, to refer to a disturbance or commotion or excitation 
in soul or body’.42 This accords well with Descartes’s second argument for recommending the 
use of émotion, namely, (b) its strong association with agitation (agitation) and disturbance 
                                                 
39 Descartes, Passions, trans. Voss, 138. 
40 Descartes, Passions, trans. Voss, 138. 
41 James, Passion and Action, 7. 
42 Descartes, Passions, trans. Voss, 138 (my emphasis). 
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(esbranlement). This still allows for the possibility that the term émotion can be used to refer 
particularly to psychological states of the soul and, moreover, psychological states of a 
specifically ‘affective’ sort. The point is simply that these are psychological agitations and 
disturbances, and not physical ones – although they may be accompanied by such.   
But now we seem to have a problem. It would appear that in this argument of Descartes’s, the 
term émotion can be viewed as pulling in two directions. One way points to a very wide and 
generic sense tied to movement, excitation, and even disturbance, that has psychological 
applications. The other is toward a much narrower psychological sense of the term that is more 
intimately associated with specifically ‘affective’ states (like joy and anger and the like).43 It is 
impossible to resolve this two-way tension in the characterisation of émotion in the above 
discussion without first considering how the term is used in the remainder of Les passions de 
l’ame. The main worry that arises is whether Descartes is ultimately inconsistent in the manner 
                                                 
43 Referring specifically to Article 27 in the 1650 Latin edition, literary scholar Russ Leo provides a compelling 
account of the complexities surrounding passiones and affectus in the Latin edition, which reflect the problems we 
have encountered with passions and émotion in the French edition. He writes: ‘where Descartes gives the first and 
most complete definition of the passions of the soul, affectus does not appear … For Descartes, passions [Passiones 
sive Affectus] are only passions insofar as they are of the soul [animae]. This is an important intervention in its own 
right, as Descartes excludes from this purview a field of related phenomena which his contemporaries still regarded 
as passions – nervous tensions, and other species of corporeal energy – in order to emphasize the distinction between 
body and soul, where passions are only appropriate to the soul and thus only to man’ (Leo, ‘Affective Physics,’ 37; 
see also Waldow, ‘Reconceptualizing Affect,’ esp. 208). 
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in which he employs the term émotion in Les passions de l’ame. Or, whether he is attempting to 
draw from its rich etymology and heterogenous usage as he sees fit.  
It is certainly a curious thing that, after recommending that we consider using the term 
émotion in the psychologically restricted sense in Articles 25 to 29, Descartes does not follow his 
own advice. He primarily resorts to passion in order to refer to states like joy and anger (and 
others like them) throughout the remainder of his discussion, with only a few scattered mentions 
of émotion. Why then recommend émotion unless one is prepared to use it? What seems odd is 
that when Descartes does mention émotion in the remainder of his book, he alternates between 
psychological and physical usages and senses of the term, without any reservation or 
explanation. This is puzzling after stipulating that we should consider using émotion in the 
psychological sense. Some commentators who have written in English on Les passions de l’ame 
do not appear to have noted, or appreciated, the significance of these irregularities surrounding 
the use of émotion.44 This most likely is because the relevant data are often masked or simply 
eliminated by translation. However, there are also French commentators who have failed to 
record and comment on the importance of the issue.45 Hence the present study, whose primary 
aim is to help bring these issues to the forefront and lay the groundwork for future commentary.  
Consider now the remaining usages of the émotion found in Les passions de l’ame. One 
important additional – and very different – psychological usage of the term has to do with so-
                                                 
44 See for example, Alanen, Descartes’ Concept of Mind,; Brown, Descartes and the Passionate Mind; Rorty, ‘From 
Passions to Emotions and Sentiments.’ 
45 For example, Rodis-Lewis, 1995. 
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called ‘interior emotions’ (émotions intèrieures), which are introduced relatively late in the book, 
at the end of Part Two (AT, XI, art. CXLVII, 440; CSM, 147, 381). This additional psychological 
sense of the term is widely recognised and discussed by philosophical commentators on Les 
passions de l’ame.46 It is first in our list, because it is well known, although it comes after other 
usages of émotion which, in sharp contrast, have commanded little or no philosophical attention 
or commentary, even though they are historically and philologically significant because they 
reflect primarily physical usages of the term.  
Briefly, the émotions interièures ‘are emotions which are produced in the soul only by the 
soul itself’ (‘excitées en l’ame que par l’ame mesme’) (CSM, 381; AT, XI, art. CLXVII, 440). In 
this respect, ‘they differ from its passions, which always depend on some movement of the 
spirits’ (‘different de ces passions, qui dependent tousjours de quelque mouvements des esprits’) 
(CSM, 381; AT, XI, art. CLXVII, 440). The term ‘excitation’ (excitées) is used in referring to 
these states in the French original, which we have seen is a core connotation of émotion in 
general. Yet that term is not captured by the English ‘produced’, which is used in the English 
translation. Which hides the fact that, in French, there is at least some etymological rationale to 
call these ‘interior’ states émotions rather than passions, even if this use of émotion seems 
inconsistent with the use of émotion to mean genuine full-bodied passions in a narrow sense 
(which depend on and maintained physical movements of the animal spirits).  
There is one last psychological sense of émotion alluded to in the remainder of Les passions 
de l’ame (AT, XI, art. XCI, 397). It occurs in the context of a discussion where purely intellectual 
                                                 
46 For example, Brown, Descartes and the Passionate Mind; James, Passion and Action. 
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joy (‘la joye purement intellectuelle’) is distinguished from joy the passion (‘cette joye, qui est 
une passion’). The former joy is said to come from the soul through the soul’s own actions (‘qui 
vient en l’ame par la seule action de l’ame’). Descartes then tells us that we can say of this 
intellectual joy that it is ‘a pleasant emotion which the soul arouses in itself’ (‘une agreable 
emotion excitée en elle mesme’) (AT, XI, art. XCI, 397; CSM, 361). As explicitly stated, such an 
emotion cannot be considered an émotion in the narrow sense of passion. It seems more like a 
simple psychological feeling (sentimen), rather than a passion in the narrow, restricted, sense, 
which is more akin to a syndrome, which is caused, maintained and fortified by animal spirits, 
and is directed to an ‘object’. 
Aside from the émotions intèrieures, and émotion as a simple feeling, which are both 
psychological states, but nonetheless still differ from émotions as passions in the narrow sense, 
the other uses of émotion in Les passions de l’ame have to do with cases where émotion is used 
in a physical sense. For example, in the context of a discussion on how to distinguish two 
varieties of anger (colère), some of the underlying physiological considerations are said to 
include, along with the presence of bile (bile), the amount of blood in the heart, which can at 
times surge, creating ‘une grande emotion dans le sang’ (AT, XI, art. CCII, 480). Now, notice 
that the allusion to émotion in the French original is not reproduced in the chosen English 
translation of the relevant passage, which reads: ‘the aversion which surprises them must drive 
enough bile into the heart to bring about a great commotion in this blood’ (CSM, 400; my 
emphasis). We return to this kind of anomaly shortly. 
Additional occurrences of physical usages of the term émotion can be found towards the very 
end of Les passions de l’ame, when Descartes is discussing ‘a general remedy for the passions’ 
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(‘un remede general contre les Passions’). For example, in one case where the blood is said to be 
moved (‘le sang tout emeu’) there is also an allusion to crying (pleurer) and trembling 
(trembler), which suggests physical forms of disturbance (AT, XI, art. CCXI, 486). Yet in the 
chosen English translation, the etymological allusion to émotion (emeu) in this passage is omitted 
and replaced by an alternative construction referring to ‘blood all in turmoil’ (CSM, 403). In 
several other passages the same translation strategy is employed and physical allusions to 
émotion and its variants are also supplanted in translation. For example, there is a French 
reference to when one feels the émotion in one’s blood (‘lorsque qu’on sent le sang ainsi emeu’) 
which is physical, but also arguably psychological, and so mixed (AT, XI, art. CCXI, 487). 
Lastly, there is a more clearly physical usage of émotion where the movement in question is said 
to reside in the blood (‘l’emotion qui est dans le sang’) (AT, XI, art. CCXI, 487). This is rendered 
in English as ‘the disturbance in our blood’ (CSM, 403). 
Finally, there are other passages where émotion is invoked in Les passions de l’ame which 
appear to reflect a purely physical sense of the term. Consider the following:  
 
Et il y a une raison particuliere qui empesche l’ame de pouvoir promptement changer 
ou arrester ses passions, l’aquelle ma donné sujet de mettre cy dessus en leur 
definition, quelles sont non seulement causées mais aussi entretenuës & fortifiées, 
par quelques mouvements particulier des esprits … et quelles sont accompagnées de 
quelque émotion qui se fait dans le cœur, et par consequent aussi en tout le sang & 
les esprits, en sortent que jusques à cette émotion ait cessé, elles demeurent presentes 




(There is one special reason why the soul cannot readily change or suspend its 
passions, which is what led me to say in my definition that the passions are not only 
caused but also maintained and strengthened by some particular movement of the 
spirits … [and] that they are all nearly accompanied by some disturbance which takes 
place in the heart and consequently also throughout the blood and animal spirits. 
Until this disturbance ceases they remain present to our mind. (CSM, 345))   
 
The above passage has to do with the reasons that prevent the soul from having full control over 
its passions, which in the original French are twice said to be émotions of the heart and blood and 
animal spirits, which are all physical phenomena. This is not evident from the English translation 
of this passage, however, which does not mention the term émotion and refers instead to a 
‘disturbance’, a strategy that is consonant with Descartes’s focus on physical bodily turbulence 
but does not capture or reflect his choice of the term émotion to make that point (CSM, 345). 
Soon after, there is another passage where the original French refers to an emotion of the blood 
(‘une émotion du sang’) but the chosen English translation mentions instead ‘a disturbance of the 
blood’ (AT, XI, art. XLVI, 364; CSM, 345). In contrast to these physical uses of émotion, in 
Article 79 love (amour) is referred to as an emotion of the soul (émotion de l’ame), while hate is 
simply labelled an emotion (émotion). These appear to be psychological uses of émotion. The 
reason for this is that in both cases, love and hate considered as emotions of the soul (émotions 
de l’ame) are contrasted with their causes (causes) which are the physical animal spirits (esprits) 
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(AT, XI, art. LXXIX, 387). In this case, the English term ‘disturbance’ is not used to translate the 
French émotion. Instead, the English term ‘emotion’ is used (CSM, 345).  
There is a very good and plausible reasons for these decisions to omit direct mention of the 
term ‘emotion’ in the English translations of émotion when it is used in a bodily and physical 
sense, namely, intelligibility for modern English readers. So the above remarks are not intended 
as a criticism of English translations of Descartes’s work. However, intelligibility of this sort is 
not the aim of the present discussion, which is concerned instead with documenting and 
understanding the challenges that Descartes faced when he tried to stipulate and introduce a more 
strictly psychological sense of the term émotion to serve as a new basis for the affective sciences. 
And for this it is necessary to revert to the original wording in both the original French and Latin 
texts in question. It is worth noting that the very first English translation of Les passions de 
l’ame47 reiterates both the psychological and physical uses of émotion by employing the English 
‘emotion’ for both (art. 46, 37–38; art. 201, 164; art. 211, 171). Perhaps this is because, much 
like émotion, ‘emotion’ had both a psychological and a bodily sense and did not then have the 
more entrenched, predominantly psychological, meaning it has today.  
 
                                                 
47 Descartes, The passions of the soule in three books the first, treating of the passions in generall, and occasionally 
of the whole nature of man. The second, of the number, and order of the passions, and the explication of the six 





The exegetical evidence documented in this study strongly suggests that Descartes did indeed 
innovate when he introduced a new psychological definition of émotion in Les passions de 
l’ame. At a time when the term had established psychological and physical uses, he chose to 
highlight only one of these. The problem is that Descartes fails to employ his psychological 
sense of émotion consistently after he says that it would be better if we used it instead of passion. 
He seems unable to extricate himself from the entangled state of the affective vocabulary of his 
time, which is reflected in both the French and Latin versions of his text – even if he did not 
translate or check the Latin version himself. Even so, Descartes’s introduction of émotion, in this 
new restricted psychological sense, certainly did have an impact. It inspired a series of efforts by 
later French, English, and other European thinkers, to explore the relation between ‘passion’ and 
‘emotion’.48 However, this observation goes beyond the bounds of the present study and requires 
a separate treatment of its own. 
Ironically, the challenges Descartes faced in trying to adopt and employ the psychological 
meaning of the term émotion are arguably still with us today. Referring to the role of Thomas 
Brown and Charles Bell in the historical trajectory of ‘emotion’ in English, historian Thomas 
Dixon writes: ‘While Brown and Bell agreed that an “emotion” was itself something mental, 
                                                 
48 Louis C. Charland, ‘Science and morals in the affective psychopathology of Philippe Pinel’, History of 
Psychiatry, 21, 1 (2010): 38-53; ‘The distinction between ‘Passion’ and ‘Emotion’. Vincenzo Chiarugi: a case 
study’, History of Psychiatry, 25, 4, (2014): 477-484; ‘William James on Passion and Emotion: Influence of 
Théodule Ribot’, Emotion Review, 11, 3 (2019): 234-246.    
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they differed over whether its constituents were primarily mental or bodily. The tensions 
between these two models were never fully resolved’.49 Documenting Descartes’s initial struggle 
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